6 have emphasized Rousseau's Discourse on Political Economy and have argued that his theory of property expresses "prioritarian libertarianism," which underscores the crucial right of selfpreservation and hence the natural foundation of ownership.
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In this article, we offer an interpretation of Rousseau's theory of property that takes into account equally the Second Discourse and Political Economy, that integrates the Social Contract into the picture, and that systematically connects the allegedly contradictory arguments found in these writings. We contend that Rousseau's position on property involved three principal arguments. 12 First, he was concerned with the social status of property, which renders its significance and consequences highly contextual. In his opinion, the normative implications of property substantially vary according to the social, cultural, and political conditions in which it is situated. This is a key reason why Rousseau's perspective on private 10 Chris Pierson, "Rousseau and the Paradoxes of Property," European Journal of Political Theory 12 (2013): 409-424. 11 Hanley, "Political Economy and Individual Liberty," 34-56. 12 In addition to the above cited works, this article also builds on work by earlier scholars who sought to reconcile Rousseau's writings on private property, including Nannerl Keohane, property is critical and affirmative without being incoherent or opportunistic. 13 Second, his positive conception of property implicitly weaves together two distinct strands of reasoning. Rousseau advances what John Rawls calls a "realistic utopian" political theory of private property, which combines "ideal" and "non-ideal" theory. On the one hand, Rousseau reflects on the "ideal" constitution of property under ideal or most favorable conditions -that is, within the context of his theory of a fully legitimate republican government. On the other hand, he also considers property when its real-world settings deviate from those that define just republics. In those reflections, thoughts about prudence also guide Rousseau's analysis. Consequently, the tensions that exist within his normative political theory of private property should not be interpreted as evidence of incoherence but rather as a reflection of the real trade-offs between principle and prudence.
Finally, with regard to Rousseau's ideal theory of private property, we emphasize a normative argument that has hitherto been often neglected in the literature. 14 We maintain that while Rousseau takes into account the natural rights of first occupants, he insists that it is the political principle of reciprocity which eventually renders individual property claims legitimate. This argument is most clearly articulated in the Social Contract, but is evident 13 On Rousseau's contextualism in this respect, see also Teichgraeber "Rousseau's Argument";
Timothy O'Hagan, Rousseau (London: New York: Routledge, 1999); Fridén, Rousseau's Economic Philosophy.
14 Putterman, in "The Role of Public Opinion," hints at some aspects of this argument when he stresses Rousseau's idea of "legal title" and of "mutually agreed upon convention(s)" as rendering the peculiar form of legitimacy of private property (435). Putterman focuses above all on the question of the relation between property and public opinion. See also Klaus D.
Schulz, Rousseaus Eigentumskonzeption. Eine Studie zur Entwicklung der bürgerlichen
Staatstheorie (Frankfurt a. M./New York: Campus, 1980). 8 throughout his oeuvre. Hence, while many interpreters consider the Social Contract as "the most difficult text to incorporate into a single, coherent Rousseauian view" on property, 15 it is precisely here that the key principle of his ideal theory of private property lies. The principle of reciprocity both implies that the legal protection of private property rights is crucial for the individual freedom of citizens and, at the same time, that there are limits equally important for citizens' freedom. Since this principle and its concrete implications can only be realized by the institution of private ownership within the context of a just republic, Rousseau holds that private property is an indispensable dimension of a legitimate and just political regime.
Understood in this manner, Rousseau's political economy offers a coherent theory of the legitimacy and political function of private property as a republican institution.
Our analysis proceeds in four stages. The first connects Rousseau's republican understanding of property with the concepts of "ideal" and "non-ideal" theory, and "realistic utopia" (originally coined by John Rawls Contract. In Rawls's opinion, a realistic utopian political theory must rely on the actual laws of nature and achieve the kind of stability those laws allow, that is, stability for the right reasons. It takes people as they are (by the laws of nature), and constitutional and civil laws as they might be, that is, as they would be in a reasonably just and well-ordered democratic society….Following Rousseau's opening thought in The Social Contract, I
shall assume that his phrase "men as they are" refers to persons' moral and psychological natures and how that nature works within a framework of political and social institutions; and that his phrase "laws as they might be" Although these conditions fall short of the social and cultural conditions of an ideal republic, they nonetheless provide the basis for legitimate or "morally permissible and politically possible" second-best solutions. The particular institutional shape of property rights must be accommodated to these conditions. 22 Rousseau's principled arguments are oriented towards the "natural" conditions of human psychology and morality as well as towards the ideal political context of a well-ordered society. His prudential arguments are normatively guided by the principles of this ideal theory of republican property, but they flexibly apply the principles to non-ideal social contexts. Taken together, these two levels of reflection form the basis of a realistic utopia of private property as a republican institution. founded not on "nature" but on society. He further argues that society is founded upon (among other things) the institution of private property.
In the Second Discourse, Rousseau is particularly interested in the social foundation of property. What can be said about language, reason, morality, and justice -that for Rousseau they are all historical results of the unfolding of the human "perfectibilité" leading from "nature" to "society" -also holds true for property. Being a proprietor is a specific feature of the "homme civilisé" but not of the "homme de la nature." Insofar as the "homme civilisé" is But surprisingly, Rousseau expresses ambivalence towards the contract that establishes these artificial distinctions. Insofar as Rousseau tells the history of mankind as a story of decay, the specific forms of private property appear problematic and illegitimate.
This, however, is not the whole story. Rousseau argues in the Social Contract that man in civil society is deprived of some advantages he received from nature. Yet, in return he gains other benefits: his faculties are "so stimulated and developed, his ideas so extended, his 31 Rousseau, "Second Discourse," 178. 32 Ibid, 131.
33 Particularly Neuhouser, "Rousseau's Theodicy of Self-Love."
16 feelings so ennobled, and his whole soul so uplifted." 35 Thus, Rousseau viewed ambivalently the historical outcomes, such as language, reason, morality, society, and property, from the unfolding of human perfectibilité.
Even in the largely critical Second Discourse, he grants property a key role in the establishment of justice. "The cultivation of the lands," he writes "necessarily followed their division; and from property, once recognized, the first rules of justice because, in order to render to each his own, each must be able to possess something." 36 This first man, according to Rousseau, was "the real founder of civil society" 37 -a formulation that turns out to imply an intriguing constructive argument, notwithstanding its mainly ironic tone. These "first rules of justice," according to Rousseau's telling, endowed actions with a morality and intelligence that were surely imperfect and partly deprived, but also completely absent beforehand. As he later stresses in the Social Contract:
The transition from the state of nature to the civil state produces a most remarkable change in man by substituting justice for instinct in his conduct and endowing his actions with the morality they previously lacked. … Out of a stupid and bounded animal [it] made an intelligent being and a man. beneath the condition he has left"-may indicate, however, that these moral improvements come mainly from a legitimate, republican contract. 36 Rousseau, "Second Discourse," 173. 37 Ibid.," 164, emphasis added. 38 Rousseau, "The Social Contract," 364-65, emphasis added.
Thus, besides being a critique, Rousseau's Second Discourse also implies a normative theory of property as a social institution. Consistent with this more differentiated view, Rousseau places the responsibility for the illegitimate manner in which property came to be protected on "society" --neither on "human nature" nor on "a divinity." 39 This is crucial, because one obvious consequence of seeing evil as a product of political and social institutions (such as private property) -instead of a divinity or human nature -is that the solution can involve changing those institutions. 40 Human nature is a fickle thing to try to change, and the heavens do not always respond to our pleas; but institutions are man-made and therefore can be re-made. Rousseau's critique therefore leads not to a complete rejection of private property. He calls neither for a "return" to some pre-proprietary "state of nature"
nor for some form of post-proprietary "communism," as some scholars have suggested, which is a criticism that conflates Rousseau's description with his prescription. 41 Rousseau is a In the Second Discourse, the solution to the problems posed by property is not found merely "in nature" and, hence, not in an abandonment of property and society altogether. It is found in a politically transformed society, which includes the institution of private property.
His solution to the contradictions of the bourgeois homme civilisé as proprietor is not the unpropertied homme de la nature, homme du communism, or proprietary statism, but private property on the basis of (and for the sake of) citizenship. Insofar as it is a social phenomenon, the meaning of property for Rousseau depends largely upon its social context, even though the natural rights associated with property are universal and prior to government. Within the natural environment of the homme sauvage, property is at best a very marginal phenomenon.
In the full sense of the term, it is nonexistent. Within the context of the contradictory, scattered categories of homme civilisé's society, property is a primary source of injustice, conflict, suffering, and cultural decay. Within the context of a "republic," and its respective "political economy", property is the cornerstone of social justice and "the most sacred of all the rights of citizenship." According to a "realistic utopian" interpretation of Rousseau's thinking, Rousseau is
proposing that the normative problem of property requires prudential considerations, yet also entails a fundamental principle. This principle, however, cannot be naturalistic. Rather, it follows a political logic that, while taking "men as they are," is still able to extend "what are ordinarily thought to be the limits of practicable political possibility." 46 Rousseau's peculiar way of connecting principle to prudential considerations gives his theory of private property its characteristic theoretical physiognomy. In the next section, we lay out its "ideal"
foundation.
The Principled Case for Private Property
Rousseau penned two works in 1755 that discuss private property at some length. The first concerns property and life -a connection that is famously associated with Locke. Rousseau avers that the law must defend private property because "it more nearly affects the preservation of life." 52 He writes: "property being more easily usurped and more difficult to defend than life, the law ought to pay a greater attention to what is most easily taken away." 53 In other words, the government provides a public good-security and the enforcement of property rights-because it would be inefficient and impracticable for each individual to provide it alone. As a consequence, government has the right to raise taxes -that 49 Hanley, "Political Economy and Personal Liberty."
50 Rawls, The Laws of the People, 7. 51 Rousseau, "Political Economy," 262-63. 52 Ibid. 53 Ibid., 263.
23 is, to interfere, within certain limits, with the property rights of citizens -in order to fulfill its protective function. 54 To the extent that citizens enjoy the security of their property rights as a public good provided by the state, the security has to be financed. This does not imply that Rousseau identifies the political problem of property with its natural foundations, or that he grants natural forms of property the status of an inviolable right. These "natural" characteristics of ownership, rooted in our psychological and moral inclinations, form the basis for Rousseau on which a Rawlsian "realistic utopia" of "the laws as they can be" has to be built. Although he, like Locke, emphasizes the importance of legally protecting and politically promoting property rights, Rousseau views the protection and promotion of natural property rights in a republic as transforming rather than merely securing these rights. This is indicated in his reflections on the status of inheritance rights and his references to Pufendorf, who had recently argued that "the right of property, by its very abstract nature, should not extend beyond the life of the proprietor, and the moment a man is dead, his goods should cease to belong to him." 62 Rousseau seems to agree with this view as far as the natural right of property is concerned. At the same time, however, he makes an interesting argument in favor of the intergenerational transfer of ownership -inheritance law.
The spirit of these laws [which regulate the power of individuals in the disposition of their own goods], which the government ought to follow in their application, is that, from father to son, and from relation to relation, the goods 60 Rousseau, "Political Economy," 263; Rousseau, "Emile," 271. But Rousseau also employs a more principled argument to explain why the natural property rights of first occupants and those of citizens apparently are not identical in scope.
Rousseau maintains that becoming a citizen gradually alters one's status as a proprietor.
Citizens, in his view, ought to contribute materially to support the republic, because as "members of a society" they have agreed in principle to subordinate at least part of their property to further the "means" to the "end" of a republican government that protects private property and provides other guarantees of security. 65 That the private property rights of citizens may at times (for instance, in the case of inheritance) "extend" and at other times "restrict" (for instance, taxation) the scope of "natural" property rights seems legitimate not only for prudential reasons, but also because it follows directly from the principle of republican citizenship. Although Rousseau only intimates at these political implications in 63 Ibid., 263. 64 Ibid., 264. 65 Ibid., 263.
Political Economy, he clearly does not merely echo Locke's idea of natural property rights.
While stressing the importance of rights as natural conditions, he at the same time indicates that they have to be integrated in a perspective that identifies the possibilities of their social and political transformation.
Only in the Social Contract, however, does Rousseau directly address the question of how to incorporate or "transform" the natural benefits of property into a well-ordered political constitution. To serve as the "center of community," as Rousseau referred to property in Geneva, property has to be transformed into a political right. This transformation "restricts"
and "extends" the natural rights of property, but most importantly the transformation also fundamentally changes the nature of property's legitimacy. In a pivotal chapter ("On the Civil
State"), Rousseau ranks civil liberty and the political right of private property as equally important. These are the two fundamental rights, in his view, that individuals gain when they become citizens in a republic. 66 Moreover, these two rights are reciprocally constitutive.
Private property is a prerequisite for citizenship, and citizenship in turn sets the frame for the This legitimacy is achieved through a twofold act of transformation, during which the right of property assumes a reciprocal form. As described in the Social Contract, the constitution of such a republican property-rights regime requires not only the alienation of all natural rights of individuals and their transfer to the sovereign. It also requires that the sovereign in turn give these rights back to individual citizens. Only after this second step is property legitimate in terms of Rousseau's ideal theory.
Rousseau describes the two steps in detail. In the first step, individuals give up all their natural rights and transfer them to the sovereign: "Each member of the community gives himself to it, at the moment of its foundation, just as he is, with all the resources at his command, including the goods he possesses." 69 However, this "total alienation" 70 is not sufficient to constitute legitimate property. It only establishes a necessary premise.
The peculiar fact about this alienation is that, in taking over the goods of individuals, the community, so far from despoiling them, only assures them legitimate possession, and changes usurpation into a true right and enjoyment 67 Rousseau, "Social Contract," 367. 68 Fridén, Rousseau's Economic Philosophy, 121. 69 Rousseau, "Social Contract," 365. 70 Ibid., 360.
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into proprietorship. Thus the possessors, being regarded as depositaries of the public good, and having their rights respected by all the members of the State and maintained against foreign aggression by all its forces, have, by a cession which benefits both the public and still more themselves, acquired, so to speak, all that they gave up.
71
In other words, the transfer of all individual possession to the sovereign is not an institutional act in its own right. It is inseparably connected with the subsequent act of "reprivatization."
Rousseau is eager to point out that "alienation" does not constitute property in the real sense of the term:
This act does not make possession, in changing hands, change its nature, and become property in the hands of the Sovereign; but, as the forces of the city are incomparably greater than those of an individual, public possession is also, in fact, stronger and more irrevocable, without being any more legitimate.
What makes mere possession "change its nature" is the second step -the transfer of property back to individual citizens. Property gains a fully legitimate status in the hands of individual citizens, as it were, and not in the hands of the state. This means that, for Rousseau, legitimate property is possible only in the form of private property. Only then is the relational right of property finally constituted and does property reach its legitimizing potential (even though it first goes through the hands of the sovereign). The legitimizing potential lies in the principle of reciprocity that property establishes:
Every man has naturally a right to everything he needs; but the positive act which makes him proprietor of one thing excludes him from everything else.
Having his share, he ought to keep to it, and can have no further right against the community. This is why the right of the first occupier, which in the state of 71 Ibid., 367. This is the core argument of Rousseau's ideal theory of private property, which he derives both from the "natural" conditions of human psychology and morality, and from the ideal social conditions of a well-ordered republic and its frame of "laws as they should, or 72 Ibid., 365. The conclusion that Rousseau appears to draw from this distinction is that a "balanced proportion" should exist between the two types of inequality because "it is contrary to the law of nature, however defined, that children should command old men and fools wise men". If the sovereign power rests upon the right of ownership, then there is no right more worthy of respect; it is inviolable and sacred for the sovereign power as long as it remains a private individual right. Once it is viewed as common to all citizens, it is subject to the common will, and this will may destroy it. The sovereign therefore has no right to touch the property of one or many, but may lawfully take possession of the property of all, as was done in Sparta in the time of Lycurgus. By contrast, the abolition of debts by Solon was an illegitimate act.
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The sovereign power therefore has the right not only to tax citizens in order to be able to 78 Rousseau's attitude toward extreme inequality in general is not the focus in this article. 79 Rousseau, "Social Contract," 367. 80 Rousseau, "Emile," 841.
protect their property, 81 but also to enforce the reciprocity principle against "natural" processes of appropriation. To be sure, it may be prudent for the sovereign to refrain from acting on this fundamental right, even when the distribution of private property in a given society compromises the principle of reciprocity, but those prudential reasons do not affect the primary argument of Rousseau's ideal theory of property.
In sum, Rousseau's ideal theory of private property grounds legitimacy on both natural and political considerations, and prioritizes the latter. The theory binds the natural conditions of human psychology and morality with the natural rights of first occupiers. Most importantly, it relies on distinctly socio-political principles of citizenship. The key legitimizing mechanism is reciprocity, as practiced in a well-ordered republic, through which the "natural right" of first occupants is transformed into a political right of citizens. The result is an 81 Hanley opines that both the right of taxation and the government's function to protect the Consequently, the principle of reciprocity may also directly legitimize forms of taxation that aim at the redistribution of private property rights.
institutionalization of private property that allows for certain inequalities, but excludes its extreme forms.
We now turn to Rousseau's "non-ideal theory" -or those statement that discuss how his ideal principles about property are to be applied, adopted, and adapted to concrete circumstances, which frequently fall short of the conditions in a well-ordered republic. As we shall see, Rousseau, while guided by the principles laid out in his ideal theory, allows for compromises, particularly with regard to the principle of reciprocity.
The Prudential Case for Private Property
Rousseau, a prudent political reformer, was generally skeptical about both reaction and revolution as viable solutions to the political problems of his day. Reaction is unsound, in his opinion, because it is futile to resist the tides of change. Although he appears to condone revolution in some writing and settings, 82 he generally urges gradualism with regard to specific private-property reforms. 83 He writes:
Nothing is more fatal to morality and to the Republic than the continual shifting of rank and fortune among the citizens: such changes are both the proof and the source of a thousand disorders, and overturn and confound everything; for those who were brought up to one thing find themselves destined for another; and neither those who rise nor those who fall are able to assume the rules of conduct, or to possess themselves of the qualifications 82 Rousseau, "Second Discourse," 381. 83 It is hard to make any categorical statements about Rousseau's views on revolution, which are outside the scope of this article. For a sustained and sophisticated discussion of the topic, see Hogel Ross Lauritsen and Mikkel Thorup, eds., Rousseau and Revolution (Camden:
Bloomsbury, 2011).
always have a natural tendency to increase." 87 But, he also prudently emphasizes the importance of taking into account the actual consequences of certain policies, laws, and institutions-not in terms of their "immediate effects," but in terms of their "distant but inevitable consequences." 88 Accordingly, any reform of the "economic system" of Poland must be oriented both towards republican principles and towards the range of possibilities set by the traditions and manners of the people, the climate conditions, and the size of the territory. These possibilities fall short of ideal conditions in several respects: Poland's territory is large and its nobility tends to engage in vainglorious display. Rousseau, therefore, entertains non-ideal solutions. The principles of republican citizenship have to be adapted to the real possibilities:
If a great state refuses to conduct itself on the principles of a small republic, it must not look for the same benefits, nor should it reject the cause while desiring the consequence. If Poland were, as I should like it to be, a confederation of thirty-three small states, it would combine the power of a great monarchy with the freedom of a small republic; but this would mean renouncing ostentation, and I am afraid that this would be the hardest thing of all.
89
In Rousseau's opinion, Poland, as it exists, cannot do without property qualifications to the dietines, without a rather elaborate monetary system, and without prudentially established forms of taxation. 90 These arrangements and institutions, while problematic when judged by republican principles, help to approach the best possible solutions. 87 Rousseau, "Poland," 1002. 88 Ibid., 1004. 89 Ibid., 1010. 90 Ibid., 1011
.
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In Corsica, Rousseau again looks closely at local conditions. Although frequently accused of using vague and flowery language, Rousseau is blunt. "It is not my intention to destroy private property, for that is impossible, but to give a rule...which will contain and direct it, and keeps it always subordinated to the public good". 91 Rousseau argues that given Corsica's rather undifferentiated peasant economy, the state should play the role of proprietor.
This, he believes, would help preserve the current overall distribution of private property.
Some readers, such as Proudhon, recognized that Rousseau was in effect justifying the statusquo and accused him of being reactionary. 92 Rousseau may have been a critic par excellence of contemporary conditions and events, but as a reformer he was exceptionally prudent, and at times unexpectedly conservative. "Precisely when Rousseau's thought appears to inspire revolutions," wrote one scholar, "it can present itself as a conservative return to the founding principles." 93 This does not mean that Rousseau's prudential reflections render his principled arguments impractical and irrelevant. "Non-ideal" compromises may be necessary given the cultural traditions and the social circumstances in a specific society, and they may be "legitimate" to the extent that they gradually enable liberty and thus approximate the requirements of the principle of reciprocity. Such compromises, however, are not fully legitimate -and this holds true particularly with respect to vast differences in propertyinsofar as they do not fully meet reciprocity's requirements and, in fact, remain an obstacle to fully establishing the principle of reciprocity. Rousseau's non-ideal theory of property should be read as an effort to design ways to live with these obstacles, if necessary, but not to recommend them as substitutes for republican citizenship and for the balance in property that republican citizenship requires.
Conclusion
In the context of his entire oeuvre, the alleged contradictions within Rousseau's theory of property turn out to be conceptual distinctions within a complex, yet coherent, overarching vision. The core normative notion is the idea of reciprocity and the reciprocal character of property rights within the framework of a "realistic utopia" of republican citizenship.
According to Rousseau, any individual claim of legitimate private property rights necessarily implies the recognition of fellow citizens' respective property claims as equally legitimate.
This indispensable basis of legitimacy rules out both "communism" as well as vast differences in private property on principled grounds.
Consistent with property's social status, the political principle of reciprocity serves as the normative connection between Rousseau's ideal and non-ideal theory of property. In terms of his ideal theory, reciprocity is his principal argument for a balanced distribution of private property. Rousseau seeks a society of proprietors in which every citizen has at least a minimal share of private property. In terms of his prudential considerations, reciprocity serves a more supple but equally essential purpose. His account of property, which retains flexibility without abandoning principles, sets an adaptable agenda for any transitory non-ideal arrangements along with standards according to which such arrangements can be assessed.
